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Taxing and Trading
in Corporate Energy
Activities: Pioneering
UK Reforms to Address
Climate Change
BENJAMIN J. RICHARDSON
School of Law, University of Manchester

KIRI L. CHANWAI
Manchester Metropolitan University

Introduction: Energy and Economic
Instruments
The landscape of UK environmental law is
changing rapidly, with important implications for
British companies. In recent years, energy activ·
ities have surfaced from the relative backwaters
of UK environmental regulation to occupy the
limelight. The reason is climate change. As the
scientific prognosis of global warming firmed,
and evidence of the likely economic and eco·
logical ramifications became better understood,
authorities in the UK and abroad have sought new
policies and laws to stem greenhouse gas
emissions. European Union (EU) and inter·
national authorities have also come to regard our
reliance on dirty fossil fuels and profligate energy
consumption as the greatest threat to sustainable
development because climate change will
eviscerate many environmental processes-and
the economic systems that depend on them-in a
pervasive way.1 Most environmental problems in
the UK so far have been dis~rete and specific-an
unsightly motorway development here, a polluting
factory there-quite unlike global warming,
whose omnipresent effects will require compre·
hensive and integrated policy packages hitherto
largely unfamiliar to government administrators.
The British Government is seeking to thwart
rising greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions principally by regulating energy activities, a difficult
cross-sectoral strategy encompassing energy use
in industry, transport, housing and other sectors,
Carbon dioxide (C02 ) is the main culprit, in 1990
1. For an overview of dangerous climate impacts in the
UK, see M. Hulme, J. Tumpenny, and G. Jenkins, Climate
· Change Scenarios for the United Kingdom: The UKCIP02
Briefing Report (University of East Anglia, 2002).

accounting for 79 per cent of all British GHG
emissions, as against methane, contributing 10
per cent, nitrous oxide an additional nine per
cent, and smaller amounts from chemicals such
as chlorofluorocarbons.2 The Government's Climate Change Programme of November 2000,3 co·
ordinated by the Department for Environment,
Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA). sketches how
the UK intends to meet its Kyoto Protocol commitment of a 12.5 per cent reduction on 1990
levels of all GHGs by 2012, and the achievement
of the separate domestic goal of a 20 per cent cut
in C02 emissions below 1990 levels by 2010. The
UK is one of the few OECD countries to have
made real progress, with its GHG emissions 14.5
per cent below 1990 levels in 1999,4 achieved
through the restructuring of the energy supply
sector with the switch from coal to cleaner natural
gas. Energy efficiency is twice that of the 1950s,
meaning that the UK is producing more with
less. But further gains of these magnitudes seem
doubtful in the absence of radically new policies
and tools, and robust economic growth in recent
years threatens to increase GHG emissions
again.
Electricity generation is the single largest
source of GHG emissions. The UK's electricity
consumption jumped by 16 per cent from 1990 to
1999, although coi emissions declined because of
the "dash for gas" and improved performance of
nuclear generation.' The switch to gas was a oneoff event, and further GHG emission reductions
must accrue by other means, such as harnessing
renewable energies including wind and solar
power. The Government admitted: "The UK's
energy sector is still largely reliant on fossil fuels
and, unless they can be replaced by plants with
low or no emissions, this dependence will
increase after 2010 as existing nuclear power
stations reach the end of their licensed lifetimes. "6
The Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution
(RCEP) recently advised that C0 2 reductions of
60 per cent by 2050 are necessary if Britain is to
avoid dangerous climate change.' The relative
economic costs of this task may not however be
so great: one study estimated the cost of achiev·
ing the RCEP's goal as about only 0.02 per cent of
Department of Environment. Food, Rural Affairs
(DEFRA), The UK's Third National Communication
Under the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (DEFRA, 2001), p.18. In all, the UK's
GHG emissions in 1990 were 208.4 million tonnes of
C02 equivalent (MtCe).
3. Climate Change: The UK Programme (Stationery Office,
2000), www.defra.gov.uk/environment/climatechongel
cm4913/indexlindex.htm.
4 . DEFRA (n.2, above) , p.5.
5. ibid., p.19.
6. ibid.. p.26.
7. 1\venty-second Report from the Royal Commission
on Environmental Pollution, Energy- The Changing
Climate, Cm 4749 (June 2000).
2.
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GDP per year.8 Of course, significant technological,
economic and regulatory changes are first necessary
to achieve such a low carbon economy.
The thrust of the Government's plan to promote
energy efficiency and expand the role of renewables is to re-orient corporate behaviour through
economic instruments.9 The key policy tools for
this task are the Climate Change Levy, a Carbon
Emissions Trading System, and a structure for
trading in renewable energy supply obligations.
The Government's focus is the industry sector,
although it accounts for a minority of Britain's
GHG emissions: transport is the biggest scourge,
accounting for about 34 per cent of final energy
use, followed by households (29 per cent) industry
and services (23 per cent) and agriculture (14 per
cent). 10 However even the targeting of industry has
its limits. The Cabinet Office's recent PIU Energy
Review declared: "there is a strong likelihood that
the UK will need to make very large carbon emission
reductions over the next century. However, it
would make no sense for the UK to incur large
abatement costs, harming its international competitiveness, if other countries were not doing the
same. "11 Climate change concerns, whilst salient,
are also only one of several key issues informing
UK energy policy, others being security of supplies,
energy affordability and market competition.
In many jurisdictions, including the UK, economic instruments have become the championed
policy tool for disciplining corporate energy use
(and other environmental activities). As early as
1992 the UK Government boldly announced, "in
future there will be a general presumption in
favour of economic instruments". 12 This commitment was reaffirmed in the 1999 Sustainable
Development Strategy, which stated: "The
Government will explore the scope for using economic instruments, such as truces and charges, to
deliver more sustainable development. Such
measures can promote change, innovation and
efficiency, and higher environmental standards. " 1 ~
The EU has also emerged as an enthusiastic
proponent of market instruments. Its 1993-2000
Fifth Environmental Action Programme called
for a "broadening of the range of instruments", 14
8. Inter-departmental Analysts Group, Long Tenn Reduction in Greenhouse Gas Emissions in the UK (February
2002).
9. Cabinet Office, The Energy Review, Performance and
Innovation Unit Report (Feb. 2002), p.1
10. DEFRA (n.2, above), p.14.
11. Cabinet Office (n.9, above), p.1.
12. UK, This Common Inheritance. The Second Year
Repon (Cmnd 2086) (Stationery Office, 1992), para.3.46.
13. Department ofEnvironment, Transport and Regions
(DETR), A Better Quality of Life: A Strotegy for Sustain·
able Development for the UK (DETR, 1999), para.5.7.
14. European Commission, Fifth Environmental Action
Programme, Towards Sustainability: A European Community Programme of Policy and Action in Relation lo
the Environment and Sustainable Development (Office
for Official Publications of the European Communities,
1992), p.101 .

19

and in 1997 the European Commission published
a Communication on Environmental Taxes and
Charges in the Internal Market. 15
There is a flourishing academic literature on
economic instruments as a means of environmental
policy. Economic theorists posit that environmental
taxes will impose lower costs on developers to
achieve a given level of pollution reduction than
conventional emission control regulations. 16
Efficient businesses will seek to lower their tax
burden by investing in clean production technologies where this is cost effective. 17 In this way,
environmental truces can give polluters an ongoing
incentive to seek more efficient ways (for example,
technological innovations or recycling), to reduce
emissions, whereas there is little financial incentive to do better once prescribed emission standards are met under conventional regulations. 18
In contrast, where truces set a "price" on use of
the environment and rely on markets to effect
corresponding behavioural changes towards the
desired environmental standard, tradeable emission
permits flow from a governmental determination
of the environmental standard in the form of
an emissions "cap" and then rely on market forces
to price and allocate the distributed tradeable
emission rights.19 The creation of exclusive and
transferable pollution rights in theory provides
businesses with an incentive to use environmental entitlements efficiently.20 Trading allows
polluters to tailor their regulatory burdens by
transferring the burdens to where they can be
borne most cheaply, thus allowing society to obtain
the same level of overall environmental protection
at a lower cost.

Climate Change Levy: the structure

Levy rates and affected sectors
Although the UK previously objected to EU proposals flagged in the early 1990s for a European
carbon tax, fearing loss of control over national
15. COM(97), February 9, 1997.
16. R. Repetto, et al., Wasting Assets. National Resources
in the Notional Income Accounts (World Resources
Institute, 1989), pp.7-8.
17. ibid., p.7.
18. R. Stavins and B. Whitehead, "Dealing with Pollution:
Market-based Incentives for Environmental Protection"
(1992) 34(7) Environment 7 at 30.
19. The literature on this subject is extensive: see,
e.g. T.H. Tietenberg, Emissions Trading: An Exercise in
Refonning Pollution Policy (Resources for the Future,
1985); S. Beder, "Charging the Earth: The Promotion of
Price-based Measures for Pollution Control" (1996) 16(2)
Ecological Economics 51.
20. D.A. Malueg, "Emission Credit Trading and the
Incentive to Adopt Ne\1 Pollution Abatement Technology" (1989] 16 /ournal of Environmenjal Economics
and Management 52.
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taxation policy,=1 in April 2001 the Governm~nt
introduced its own tax as a means of enablmg
Britain to achieve its emission reduction targets
under the Kyoto Protocol. 22 When plans for the
Climate Change Levy (CCL) were mooted in 1999,
the proposal not surprisingly received a hostile
reception from various businesses, especially the
energy intensive chemical and steel industries. 23
Consequently, the Levy was eventually introduced as a modest charge whose impact would be
softened by various financial concessions and
benefits.
Implemented through the Finance Act 2000,
the CCL applies to energy used by industry and
the public sector, but not to energy consumed in
households, transportation or registered charities.
Also exempt are small businesses using limited
amounts of energy below specified thresholds.
Further, horticulturalist businesses, recognised by
the government as a "special case" high energy
user, enjoy a 50 per cent discount on the Levy for
up to five years. Not all fuels are taxed. Renewable energy (with the exception of large-scale
hydropower greater than lOMWJ is exempt from
the CCL, so as to provide an incentive for businesses
to opt for non-fossil fuel sourced electricity.
Suppliers of exempt renewable energies must
hold a Levy Exemption Certificate, issued by the
Office of the Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem).
Also exempt is good quality combined heat and
power (CHP), which is a low carbon energy form,
fuels used as a feedstock, and electricity used in
electrolysis processes (for example, in aluminium
smelting). Electricity from nuclear power, although
not a fossil fuel, is subject to the CCL-arguably
an appropriate measure given that nuclear power
poses its own environmental problems (for example,
treatment of radioactive waste) and to exempt
nuclear energy could have encouraged more
investment in this sector at the expense of the
fledgling renewables market. The CCL does not
apply to oils already subject to excise duties.
The current CCL rates are 0.15 p/kWh for gas,
coal and coke, 0.43 p/kWh for electricity and
0.07 p/kWh for LPG, and the Levy is set to rise
year-on-year, althqugh no rise was made on its
2002 anniversary. The CCL is added to energy
consumers' bills before VAT and shown as a
separate item.

21. D. Maddison end D. Pearce, "The UK and Global
Warming Policy", UK Environmental Pa/icy in the 1990s,
in T.S. Gray (ed), UK Environmental Policy in the 1990s
(Macmillan, 1995), 123 at 138-139.
22. See S.A. Price, "Environmental Taxation: The U.K.'s
Proposed Climate Change Levy" [1999] 12 Opinion 335.
23. B. Church, "Climate Change Levy-Hot Air or Cold
Comfort?" (2001) 29(12) Energy Policy 947.

Levy concessions and off-setting
entitlements
The CCL was advanced on a roughly revenue neutral
basis, to be offset by a 0.3 per cent reduction in all
employers' national insurance contributions (NICs).
The scheme also includes the sweetener of an
80 per cent Levy rebate for those energy intensive
industries participating in a Climate Change
Agreement to meet targets for improving energy
efficiency or reducing emissions. The CCL's financial impact is further assuaged by the enhanced
capital allowances (ECAs) scheme, whereby
investment in specific energy efficient products
(for example, pipe-work insulation and thermal
screens) enables companies to reclaim 100 per
cent of the capital allowance in the first year.
The ECAs are administered by the Carbon lhlst,
established in April 2001 as an independent,
non-profit-making company to recycle some
£150 million of CCL receipts over three years to
quicken the adoption of low carbon technologies.
The Trust's remit extends to provision of advice
and information, research and demonstration
projects. Overall, the CCL package promises a
wonderful synergy of more energy efficiency, jobs
growth through investment in renewables and the
stimulus of NIC reductions, but without draining
businesses' finances.
The main way energy hungry companies can
manage their levy liability and improve environmental performance is through participation in the
Climate Change Agreements (CCAs). An 80 per
cent discount from the Levy is available to
companies that pursue challenging targets for
improving energy efficiency or reducing carbon
emissions through agreements negotiated between
their relevant sector trade associations and DEFRA.
The scheme is restricted to "energy intensive"
industries, as defined in Schedule 1 to the
Pollution Prevention and Control (England and
Wales) Regulations 2000, and agreements operate
until March 31, 2013. To date, umbrella agreements
with 44 trade associations have been concluded,
each association covering a plethora of individual
businesses and some 8,000 industrial sites in
all. Examples include the Brewers and Licensed
Retailers Association; British Cement Association;
Society of Motor Manufacturers and 'Ifaders Ltd;
UK Steel (Environmental) Limited; Food and
Drink Federation; and British Apparel and Textiles
Confederation.
The CCAs do not specify how businesses
should achieve energy reduction and efficiency
performance targets; rather, they detail the goals
and methods for calculating performance, and
reporting and verification protocols. 24 Each sector

bas a target and a set of two-yearly milestones when
performance is reviewed. Failure to meet agreed
targets results in the Levy rebates being suspended
or withdrawn. Parties that exceed their targets
may trade their "credits" in the government's emission allowance trading scheme, and may purchase
allowances if necessary to meet target shortfalls.

Implementation of the Levy
Assessing the overall financial and environmental
impact of the Levy, the picture after 18 months is
inauspicious. During its first year, the CCL was
reported to be a net burden on the public purse. 25
It was predicted to raise about £1 billion, but only
generated £551 million whilst the government
returned to businesses £1.05 billion in reduced
employers' NICs (and the NIC reductions are distributed to all companies, regardless of whether
they are subject to the Levy). On the environmental
criterion, according to DEFRA, C02 emissions
actually rose by 1.5 per cent in 2001, supposedly
due to more coal usage in power stations in
response to higher gas prices. 28 The Government
estimated that the CCL package (including CCAs,
etc.) would save 5 MtCe per year by 2010. 2 7 The
Energy Minister, Brian Wilson, has since admitted
that at this stage it appears unlikely that Britain
will reach its stepping-stone target of 5 per cent of
electricity generated from renewables by the end
of 2003. 28
Much of the current debate about the future
of the CCL has focused on the economic impacts
in the private sector. Prior to its adoption, a sensational report by Business Strategies predicted
the Levy would result in the shedding of 156,000
jobs over 10 years.29 Other key worrying forecasts
were a decline in UK manufacturing productivity
by 0.8 per cent and a weakening of UK businesses'
international competitiveness. Interestingly, the
UK steel, chemical and engineering industry associations, sponsored the report. Various trade and
industry periodicals also carried similar alarmist
predictions.30 More recently, Church argued that
as UK companies had already made great strides
in improving their energy and materials efficiency
in order to stay in business, the Levy would push
many firms at the margins of solvency over
the edge. 31 Such bold views however ignore that

...

e.f.

24. See, e.g. Sch.2, Umbrella Climate Change Ag~ee·
ment for the Food And Drink Sector, March 2001.
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25. P. Firth, "Money lo Bum", (5 July 2002) 18(5)
Utility Week 18.
26. Cited in ibid.
27. DEFRA (n.2, above). p.30.
28. R. Milne, "Green Energy Target Problem", (May 17,
2002) 17(20) Utility Week 13.
29. Business Strategies Ltd, The Climate Change Levy
-Impact on the UK Economy Uuly 1999).
30. See,
D. Howell, "Climate of Fear" (2000) 13(17)
Professiona Engineering 38; Anonymous, "Climate Levy
Cost Rises" (2001) 127(1290) A ccountancy 15.
31. Church (n.23, above).

...
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carbon taxes already exist in the Scandinavian
countries and other EU states and various nonEuropean states are advancing new carbon taxes,
such as New Zealand. n Existing academic
research on the economic effects of carbon taxes
is also equivocal. 33
Other studies highlighted possible regional and
sector specific effects of the Levy. The chemical,
plastics and steel industries are among industry
sectors commentators predicted would be maligned
by the CCL because of their high-energy needs
and low staffing.34 By contrast, the services sector
would be relatively unaffected and possibly even
benefit because services such as hotels, catering
and retailing are labour intensive with weak trade
connections to the manufacturing industry. However, such differences do not seem to account for
the fact that energy intensive industries are eligible
to receive an 80 per cent CCL rebate by participating
in the CCAs. Apart from differential industry
sector effects, there are also possible geographical
variations in the impact of the CCL. Business
Strategies predicted such regional disparities,
with northern British manufacturers to be disproportionately affected because of their higher
concentration of energy intensive companies
(thus widening the "North-South" divide).35
Recently, several studies have looked at the actual
implementation of the Levy. SGS Consulting surveyed 100 small and medium enterprises (SMEs)
in 2002, and found that one in five enterprises
were unaware that the Levy had come into force,
and that almost one-quarter of firms did not under·
stand the Levy's purpose or how its revenue was
spent. 36 One-half of SME manufacturers believed
that the CCL would ultimately have a negative
impact on their business and only one-quarter of
respondents believed that the Levy would yield
positive effects: The study found that 27 per cent
of SMEs had implemented a programme to monitor or manage their energy consumption, with
installation of energy efficient lighting being the
most popular method. SGS Consulting suggested
special measures were needed in the CCL package
to directly target and assist SMEs given that
because of their size they have less access to the
32. A. Barenzini, J. Goldemberg, S.A. Speck, .. A Future
for Carbon Taxes" (2000) 32(3) Ecological-Economics
395; Minister for Energy, P. Hodgson, " Climate Change
Policy: Early Decisions and Directions", Media Statement (August 30, 2002).
33. See, e.g. C. Kemfert end H. Welsch, "Heinz Energy·
Capital-Labor Substitution and the Economic Effects of
C02 Abatement" (2000) 22(6) Journal of Policy Madeling
641; B.J. Heijdra and A. ven Der Horst, "Taxing Energy to
Improve the Environment: Efficiency end Distributional
Effects" (2000) 148(1) De Economist 45.
34. See, e.g. P. Gander, " Plastics Under Strain from
Climate Levy" {2002) 77(4) Food Manufacture 18.
35. Business Strategies (n.29, above).
36. SGS Consulting, 011e Year On: The Impact of
the Climate Change Levy on Manufacturi'}g SMEs (June
2002).
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CCL agreements or access to exempt CHP-derived
electricity. 37
A second survey, conducted by London
Electricity, of professionals working in the energy
industry revealed that 42 per cent of respondents
felt the CCL had led to a net increase in their
business's costs and 33 per cent did not believe
that the CCL had prompted new energy management initiatives. 33 In terms of renewable energy
information, 60 per cent of respondents agreed
that more guidance was needed on how to obtain
and utilise green energy. A third, more detailed
study on the CCL, conducted by the Federation
of Small Businesses, also suggested the Levy is
having a discriminatory impact on small firms. 39
It found that 66 per cent of SMEs are better off
because they benefit from the NIC reduction whilst
remaining under the CCL exemption threshold.
Of the 34 per cent of SMEs subject to the Levy,
FSB concluded that 88 per cent were financially
worse off.4° The FSB study saw the likely losers of
the CCL being SMEs involved in plastics processing, hospitality and certain retailers. It gave as an
example a plastic moulding company employing
35 staff that was unable to participate in a CCL
Agreement and incurred a net loss of £6,875 due
to the CCL in its first year of operation. 41 The study
was critical of the additional costs of participating
in the CCL Agreements, namely membership and
joining fees.42
Generally, existing studies emphasise that
certain business sectors are worse off from the
Levy, although overall the economic burden and
dislocation is modest. Information from the Department of Trade and Industry showed that the Levy
added 0.9 per cent to the monthly input prices
index for materials and fuels in April 2001-hardly
a staggering impact, and one offset by the recycling
of levies to industry through, inter alia, reduced
NICs and the ECAs.43 In evaluating the effect of
the CCL on energy prices, it should also be seen in
the context of the not insignificant declines in
electricity prices in recent years: enhanced competition in energy markets resulted in industrial
electricity prices in the UK falling by some 20 per
cent during the late 1990s.44 Regarding possible
changes, the Levy scheme could be amended to
recycle all CCL receipts into energy efficiency
grants and similar investments rather than
offering blanket NIC reductions to businesses
37. ibid., pp.10-11.
38. London Electricity, Climate Change Levy Report
(June 2002).
39. Federation of Small Businesses, The Climate Change
Levy. Another Cost for Small Businesses (July 2002).
40. ibid.• p.6.
41. ibid.• p.24.
42. ibid., p.12.
43. Anonymous, "Climate Levy Price Rise Less Than
Feared" (May 24, 2001) Supply Management 8.
44. DEFRA (n.2, above), p.14.

generally.45 Also, it seems authorities could do
more to impart information to affected industries
on the structure of the Levy and its rationale, as
well as further investigation of possible new
concessionary arrangements for SMEs. Perhaps
the most crucial issue that will shape the success
of the Levy, is whether there will be sufficient
green energy supply to meet the growing demand
from businesses wishing to reduce Levy
payments. If businesses lack alternatives to fossil
fuels, then the Levy may end up being treated as just
another tax to be grudgingly paid. The question
of expanding supply of renewable energies is
considered later in this article.
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Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading
Scheme
Emissions trading framework
The CCL is not a discrete policy mechanism, but
is part of a package of climate change response
instruments. Another key mechanism is the Emission Trading Scheme (ETS), which is also likely to
feed into the wider EU environmental trading
market proposed. In March 2002 the Commission
released a Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a
scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance
trading within the Community. 45 The draft Directive
covers just carbon emissions, on the basis that they
amount to 80 per cent of the EU's CHG emissions,
and trading would be open only to major industrial facilities. If adopted, the Directive would
empower EU Member States to grant polluters
carbon allowances, within allocated national
allowances, which would be traded among eligible
businesses across the EU.
As with the EU's plans, the UK's motivations
are to enable industry and regulators to gain early
experience on the technicalities of emissions
trading pending commencement of global-wide
trading under the auspices of the Kyoto Protocol. The allocation of exclusive and transferable
pollution rights in theory gives firms an incentive
to use their environmental entitlements in the most
cost-effective manner tailored to each company's
operational requirements.47 The UK's ETS is a
pilot, voluntary initiative, which went live on
April 2, 2002 and will operate in its first phase
until December 31, 2006. The Government believes
the ETS could deliver annual emissions savings
45. L. Cork, "Levy Charges Ahead" (June 2001) 54(6)
Works Management 20.
46. COM(2001) 0581.
47. D.A. Malueg, "Emission Credit Trading and the
Incentive to Adopt New Pollution Abatement Tech·
nology" (1989) 16 Journal of Environmental Economics
and Management 52.
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There are several ways companies may join the
ETS. The main way is as a "Direct Participant",
whereby firms volunteer to take on absolute targets
for one or more sources in return for financial incentive payments if the agreed targets are reached.
The "sources" Direct Participants may enter into
the Scheme could be an entire factory complex,
but excluded sources that cannot be entered include direct emissions from electricity generation,
emissions from facilities already covered by a
Climate Change Agreement and emissions from
households. Companies may only participate
through this route if they have successfully bid for
the emission reduction targets and the financial
incentive payments distributed at the auction.52

The share of the incentive payments was determined by the government-administered auction
held on March 11-12, 2002. 53 As a result of the
auction, 34 companies signed up to the ETS,
including: Asda, Barclays, British Airways, BP,
Dupont UK, Ford Motor Company, Lend Lease
Real Estate, Rolls Royce, Shell UK and Tesco. The
average emission reduction targets set by the auction
was 11 per cent below participants' historic baseline emissions, which according to DEFRA would
save about 1.1 MtCe of emissions that would otherwise occur. 54 Further auctions may be held to
enable other companies to enter the ETS. In the
auction, companies that wished to participate in
the ETS bid for a share of the £215 million incentive
payments by specifying the reduction in annual
emissions they would make from their historic
emissions baseline by the end of 2006. The reduction in annual emissions was then divided into
five equal annual targets over 2002 to 2006. Each
Direct Participant was allocated at the beginning
of each year emission "allowances" (i.e., unit of
trade) equal to their capped emissions target for
that year. Emission allowances were denominated
in C02 or its equivalent. Thus, to illustrate hypothetically, a Direct Participant with a baseline
of 1,000 tonnes of C02 equivalent (tC02 e) that
successfully bid in the auction for 100 tC02 e,
must then reduce its emissions by 100 tC02e
at the rate of 20 tC01e each year over five years. If
the final clearing price at the auction was £20 per
tC02e, the Direct Participant would receive £400
per annum of incentive payments each year
for achieving its emission reduc~on target or
£2,000 over five years.
Successful bidders formalised their commitments through an agreement with the DEFRA
Secretary of State, whereby they agreed to comply
with the rules of the Scheme, such as in relation
to emissions reporting." Participants that fail to
meet their annual emission targets (after the threemonth "reconciliation period" where participants
are given time to put their house in order by
purchasing if necessary additional allowances to
make up any shortfall), not only forfeit their
incentive payment, but will have their following
year's allocation of emission allowances reduced
by a factor of 1.3 of the amount emissions exceeded
the target. The Government has also indicated that
it may introduce statutory fines for breaches.56
There are other routes by which an organisation may join the ETS. The main alternative is
through an existing target set through a Climate

48. DEFRA (n.2, above), p.31.
49. Environmental Protection Act 1990, s.153, provides
the legal basis for the incentive payments to participating
organisations.
50. See www.defra.gov.ukletr.
51. DEFRA, Fromework for the UK Emissions Trading
Scheme (DEFRA, August 2001), p.6.
52. For details of the auction process, ibid., pp.15-16.

53. DEFRA, "Auction Success for UK Emissions Trading
Scheme", Press Release (March 13, 2002): www.defra.
gov. uk/ newsl 2002/ 02313c.htm.
54. ibid.
55. For a copy of the slandard agreement, see www.
defra.gov.uklenvironmentlclimatechangelpdfltroding/pdfl
trodingdp_agreement.
'
56. DEFRA (n.51, above), p.33.

of between 0.8 to 2 MtCe annually by 2010.45
Its details were outlined in DEFRA's Framework
for the UK Emissions Trading Scheme (August
2001), which followed the Department's consultation paper, A Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Trading Scheme for the United Kingdom (November 2000). Commitments that companies volunteer
to assume derive largely from contract and
general administrative power rather than new
regulation.49 The Government has established ~
process of mediation and adjudication to resolve
any disputes between participants and DEFRA.
The ETS is generally open to businesses
and other organisations in the UK responsible
for GHG emissions. A new Emissions Trading
Authority, under the wing of DEFRA, oversees the
administration of the ETS including responsibility
for managing the Registry,50 which records ETS
participants' emission targets and trades. The ETS
participants have ·several means of meeting their
emission assigned targets. They can reduce their
own emissions through in-house operational and
material changes, and sell any excess allowances
or bank them for future contingencies. Alternatively, if companies will exceed their target they
may purchase the necessary additional emission
allowances from other ETS participants. Overall,
the scheme should reduce the total quantity of
emissions among ETS participants over the period
2002 to 2006 by the descending emission cap
targets set annually. According to. DEFRA, this will
give "all participants ... a direct incentive to
innovate and invest in new technologies to reduce
their costs of complying with targets" .51

Trading participants

.

~
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Change Agreement (CCA). Rather than receive
emission allowances up-front via the auction
process, "Agreement Participants" (as they are
known) may receive emission allowances at the
end of each "milestone year" (a biennial period)
for the amount by which they exceed their CCA
target. If they miss their target, they could also
purchase additional allowances to make up for
the shortfall. Importantly, Agreement Participants
cannot benefit from the ETS financial incentive
payments for emissions that benefit from the CCL
discount, but a company in a CCA may still bid
through auctions for financial incentive in relation
to their emissions not covered by the CCA targets.
Companies may also enter the ETS as Project
Participants. 57 By this route, companies undertake
specific UK-based emissions reduction projects
and sell any resulting emission credits to other
participants in the Scheme. The details of this
method of entry are still being formulated by
DEFRA. At this stage, carbon sequestration projects (for example, afforestation activities) would
not be eligible projects because of "complexities
and uncertainties" involved in measuring carbon
sequestration from forestry activities.58 Finally, it
is also open to anyone to open an account in the
Registry to trade allowances even though they are
not a polluter. Accordingly, an environmental nongovemment organisation could open a trading
account to purchase emission allowances in the
market and then cancel them.~
Traded allowances are deemed to be revenue
items for tax purposes. Thus, companies purchasing
allowances will receive tax relief on the cost, and
companies that make profits from the sale of allowances will be taxed. The Government has stated
that it does not consider trading in allowances
to be an investment activity regulated under the
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, although
dealing in derivatives on allowances would amount
to a regulated investment activity.llO
9

Trading in renewable energies

The renewables obligation
Apart from the ETS, the other mainstay of the
Government's climate change policy is the Renewables Obligation (RO). It commenced on April 1,
2002, by statutory order made pursuant to the
Electricity Act 1989 and the Utilities Act 2000,
and is supervised by Ofgem.81 It obliges UK
57. ibid.. p.35.
58. ibid.
59. ibid.• p.25.
60. ibid., p.37
61. For details of the RO scheme, see The Renewables
Obligation Order 2000, SI 2002/914. The Utilities Act,
s.62, provided for the amendment of the Electricity Act
1989, s.32, to enable the Secretary of State to impose

electricity suppliers to increase their provision
of renewable energy supply to 10.4 per cent by
April 2010, and there are stepping stone targets
beginning with 3 per cent by March 2003. 62 The
RO initiative is one way the UK Government is
seeking to meet umbrella energy targets set by the
EU. The 1997 EU White Paper on renewable
energy envisaged doubling renewable generation
in the EU by 2010.83 The 2001 EU Renewables
Directive has specified indicative targets for each
Member State.64 The EU has adopted two targets
for renewable energy-a 12 per cent target for
renewable energy as a percentage of total energy
consumption, and a 22.1 per cent target for renewable electricity as a percentage of total electricity consumption. 65 The UK Government has
endorsed these targets,58 not merely due to climate
change considerations, but also to promote
national energy security given predictions that
Britain may need to rely increasingly on imports
to fuel its burgeoning economy.57
Under the RO scheme, which has replaced the
ineffectual Non-Fossil Fuel Orders,81 suppliers in
compliance with their green energy quota are
issued a Renewable Obligation Certificate (ROC).
Ofgem is responsible for assessing and monitoring
the extent of compliance by suppliers. Most renewable energy sources (for example, wind and solar}
may be used to meet the RO, except energy from
waste and large-scale hydropower. If a supplier
cannot meet the RO, it can buy out a fee to Ofgem
for each MWh short, cUITently set at £30 per MWh,
or purchase ROCs from other suppliers willing to
trade them as permitted by the Utilities Act.
Energy supply companies may pass on the costs
of purchasing renewable electricity to their
customers; recent retail electricity prices suggest
the RO has added 3 per cent to consumers' electricity bills. 89 The money collected by Ofgem from
penalties is paid back to suppliers in proportion
to how much renewable electricity they have
sourced. Thus, the mechanism provides an incentive to invest in renewables, as suppliers will
receive more money from the penalty fund and
obligations in connection with electricity from renewable sources.
62. ibid.. Sch.1.
63. European Commission, Energy for the Future:
Renewable Sources of Energy, COM(97)599 final,
(November 26, 1997).
64. Directive 2001/77, On the promotion of electricity
produced from renewable energy sources in the internal
electricity market, September 27, 2001.
65. Directive 2001/77, Art.3(4).
66. Cabinet Office (n.9, above), p.1.
67. House of Commons Trade and Industry Committee,
Security of Energy Supply (HC 364).
68. In relation to this scheme and its problems, see
House of Commons, Select Committee on Environmental
Audit, A Sustainable Energy Strategy? Renewables and
the PIU Report (July 2002). p.42.
69. Anonymous, "Electricity Suppliers Hike Prices to
Pay for Environmental Obligations" (April 11, 2002]
25(15) Marketing Week (UK), 6.
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will not have to pay as much into it. The RO
scheme is a long-terni measure, with obligations
in place for 25 years and with the size of the
obligation open to being increased progressively.70
The environmental effects of the RO scheme
could be significant, saving some 2.5 MtCe emissions by 2010 if properly implemented. 71 Already,
an increasing number of electricity suppliers are
offering "green options", such as Powergen {offering totally green power contracts) and British
Energy (offering partial green power deals).72 Yet,
much work needs to be done to realise this target.
Currently, only about 2.6 per cent of the UK's
electricity (4,869 MWh) is derived from renewable sources, the bulk of which comes from largescale hydroelectric plants.73 The HCEAC74 believes
the Government will achieve only 5 per cent of
total electricity generation from renewables by
2010 at current rates, and it disclosed that in 2001
there was actually a slight fall from 2.8 per cent
to 2.6 per cent (primarily due to less production
from small hydropower plants). The UK ranks
near the bottom among EU States in terms of
renewable energy generation, reflecting an historic
lack of support for renewables compared to
Germany, Denmark and Sweden, among others. 75
Although the UK has extensive potential renewable energy sources {especially wind power
in Scotland), the HCEAC has cautioned, "such
estimates do not take full account of the costs of
developing and utilising the resource, or of the
technical constraints faced".78

Barriers to expanding renewable energy
supplies
Nor do such energy supply estimates allow for the
institutional and regulatory barriers to investment
in green energy ventures. These barriers include
planning legislation, the structure of the electricity
grid, and the New Electricity Trading Arrangements. Because renewable energy projects may
interfere with wildlife movement, generate noise
or visual pollution, and disturb local environments during project construction, such projects
are regulated under the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. Project approval must accord with
the relevant local development plan, and certain
large-scale projects or developments in sensitive
70. A. Lloyd. "The UK Renewable Obligation" (20011
5(1) Power Economics 21.

See Lattice Group. at www.goshelp.co.uk.
A. Horstead, "April Falls" [April 26, 2002) 17(17)
Utility Week 14.
73. Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), Energy
Trends (DTI. June 2002). p.25.
74. HCEAC (n.68, above), para.51.
75. See B. Richardson, "European Energy Law: New
Measures for Sustainable Development" (2002) 4(13)
Butterworths Resource Management Bulletin 150.
76. HCEAC (n.68, above), para.15.
71.
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areas require a formal environmental impact assessment before permission can be granted. 77 Obtaining development permission from responsible
local government authorities is emerging as a
major obstacle to the increased deployment of
renewables, especially for on-shore wind power
farrns.78 According to HCEAC, the success rate of
planning applications for renewable projects in
England and Wales has to date been only about 26
per cent, although better rates of success have
occUITed in Scotland.79 Opposition to renewable
energy projects has come from local communities
(concerned about interference with visual
amenities) and public bodies such as the Ministry
of Defence (concerned that wind farms interfere
with low flying aircraft and radar sites). Whilst
the cUITent statutory guidance, Planning Policy
Guidance 22, Renewable Energy (1993), supports
the environmental benefits of increasing renewable energy generation, it is short on specifics on
how to implement more such projects through the
planning system. The solution to such problems
requires more than mere policy guidance, but
amendments to planning legislation to allow fasttrack approvals for certain types of priority renewable energy projects, coupled with clear regional
targets quickly incorporated into local government plans to facilitate project approvals.
The connection of power generated from
renewable energy projects to the electricity grid
also appears to be a source of concern. The Utilities
Act 2000 separated the electricity supply function
from the distribution network function. It is a
grid structure that tends to benefit. large energy
suppliers, such as nuclear stations and coal/gas
plants, which have economies of scale and market
leverage. There are also ancillary technological
barriers to securing optimal grid access for renewable energy suppliers. Wind farms, CHP plants
and certain other energy generators require a system able to accommodate small and intermittent
sources on the distribution network. This requires
the distribution network operators to manage
networks to facilitate "embedded generation",
whereby small generators can enjoy flexible distribution and local connections. 80 Ofgem is exploring new arrangements to facilitate small green
energy suppliers' market access, such as reduced
or flexible grid connection charges, although
concrete solutions have yet to be adopted.
Another problematic feature of electricity
networks is the UK's New Electricity Trading
Arrangements (NETA). NETA was introduced on

72.

77. As specified by the Town and Country Planning
(Environmental Impact Assessment) Regulations 1999.
78. See G. Hartnell, Renewabler-Post NFFO Contracts
(Norton Rose, 2002); OXERA Environmental, Regional
Renewable Energy Assessments (OXERA, 2002), pp.4-5,
35-36.
79. HCEAC (n.68, above), p.58.
80. ibid., paras 92- 94.
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March 27, 2001, replacing the Electricity Pool
as the wholesale electricity market for England
and Wales. Under NETA, electricity suppliers and
generators trade forward through bilateral contracts, and penalties are imposed where demand
exceeds contracted levels or generation falls short
of it. Through these market reforms, NETA sought
to stimulate genuine competition into wholesale
electricity trading and provide price reductions
for consumers. Concerns are emerging regarding
the adverse impact NETA is having on small and
intermittent electricity generators, which comprise
many renewable energy suppliers. 81 For small
energy generators, whose supplies may be variable and less reliable, there is a danger of breaching contracted supply levels and so incurring
heavy financial penalties. The problem for wind,
for example, is that if generators offer to supply and
the wind subsides, the supplier has to buy in the
open "spot" market, which can result in expensive
purchases.
According to Ofgem, NETA is already driving
down prices in England and Wales with annual
contracts agreed by large industrial customers involving prices some 10 to 15 per cent on last year,
and down 35 per cent over the last two years. 82 An
electricity market that generates on-going, sizeable
price reductions for businesses and households
may be economically welcome, but it is also a
market that can dampen the incentives to use
energy more frugally and efficiently. It is a market
at odds with climate change policy if such consumption is of fossil fuels. In the absence of a
much larger renewable energies market and a much
larger margin of difference between the retail
price of green and brown energy, the electricity
market deregulation reforms may undermine
the Government's initial GHG emission control
mechanisms.

Conclusions
Several important lessons are emerging from
current UK reforms to control GHG emissions.
First, the effectiveness of the Climate Change
Levy requires complementary measures to reinforce the financial incentives conveyed to
promote energy efficiency and reduce use of fossil
fuels. The Emissions 'Ii'ading Scheme, the Enhanced
Capital Allowances, and the Renewables Obligation
are some of these key complementary measures.
However, it is clear that there remain various
barriers to stimulating the renewable energies
market despite the exemption of renewables from
81 . See Ofgem, Report to the DTI on the Initial Impact
of NETA on Smaller Generators (August 2001).
82. See Ofgem. 1vww.ofgem.gov.uk/ e/arch/ retadocsl
golive_explained.pdf

the Levy. Complex planning regulations, inflexible local governments, and electricity grid structures are some of these barriers. These barriers
are not insurmountable, but do need to be
addressed soon in order to fully realise the potential of the Levy.
Secondly, the current UK reform focus on
corporate energy activities is inappropriately
restrictive given that the largest, and growing
sources, of fossil fuel emissions are the transport
and household sectors. To avoid dangerous
climate change, UK policy must more assertively
target these sectors. The Government believes that
its climate change programme, including the CCL
and the ETS, will reduce carbon emissions in
2010 by some 15 per cent below their 1990 levels,
and all Kyoto GHG regulated emissions 23 per
cent below 1990 levels.13 But beyond this timeframe, the Government has admitted that, without
new policy measures, GHG emissions (especially
coil will bloat because of economic growth and
the retirement of nuclear power stations.14
Among the limited initiatives to address
transport emissions, the Government released in
2002 a 10-Year Plan of £180 billion new investment and public spending to cut traffic congestion
and reduce pollution.85 The existing vehicle excise
duty and company car tax reform also provided
modest incentives to reduce private motoring.88
Yet, the Government appears unwilling to engineer
more radical reforms because of the threat of a
political backlash from motoring groups, whose
fuel price protests in 1999 caused the Government to abandon the fuel duty escalator. There
has been even less progress in the household sector,
where social justice considerations have tended
to mollify the Government from hiking energy
charges that could disproportionately hurt poor
families. So far the Government has been relying
on soft, non-intrusive measures, including reduced
VAT on home energy efficiency services and
materials; subsidies on efficient gas central heating boilers; energy efficiency labelling schemes;
end periodic promotional advertising campaigns
on energy efficiency.87 The Government is also
making amendments to Building Regulations to
spur energy efficiency building design.81
Overall, the UK reforms are an admission of
market failure in energy markets to address
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environmental issues like ·climate change. The
essential challenge for the Government is to
implement market correction instruments that
can factor environmental costs into energy markets.
Although the CCL is a pioneering step, this is
largely new terrain for government reformers and
it is very likely that the Levy, and other policy
instruments, will be adjusted and fine-tuned as
experience with economic instruments grows. For
British companies, the regulations and incentives
governing energy use are changing rapidly, but
they are changes that do not necessarily entail
competitive stifling taxes. Rather, off-setting tax
reductions (for example, NICs} coupled with new

market opportunities in the renewable energy
and emission trading field, suggest these changes
will, apart from the environmental benefits, be
economically beneficial to the UK. Already, the
United States is looking very isolated in its refusal
to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, as Australia, Canada
and other Western countries move to join the
Protocol in response to pressures from domestic
businesses that see green energy markets as a
potentially profitable new domain.89

89. "Kyoto Now a Possibility, Says Lonely PM'',
Sydney Morning Herald (September 5, 2002), 2.

83.

DEFRA (n.2, above), p.53.
ibid., p .44.
85. Department of Transport (DoTJ, 1h1nsport 2010The 10 Year Plan (DoT, 2001).
86. Inland Revenue, "Protecting the Environment:
Refonn of Company Car Taxation" (Inland Revenue,
March 21, 2000).
87. For example, the Energy Efficiency Commitment,
and the Home Energy Efficiency Scheme: see further
DEFRA (n.2, above). p.32
88. See 1vww.safety.dtlr.gov.uklbregslcansultleeplindex.
htm.
84.

12003) J.C.C.LR.. ISSUE 1 C SWEf.T A MAXWEU. UMJTED IAND CONTRIBUlURS)

27

l2110ll I.CC.LR . ISSUE 1 C SWEET A MAXWEU. LIMITED IAND CONTRIBUTORSI

